1: Niederle--36 E-5 1911 E/6 Slavic Peoples E/6
Trans* Russia R2

S.P. T.R. 181 mores and customs. And this difference is further emphasized by their historical careers and in these latter years by their political divergences. These divergences go so far that they sometimes result in a rupture of S.P. T.R. 181 all of the ties of kinship. The representatives of the intellectual class among the Ukrainians are unwilling to consider themselves as Russians, as a nation of the same origin and of the same character as the Russians. 186 They tear the unity of the Russian world into two segments, into two nations: the one located to the north is made upof the Great Russians, the Russians Kat'eksokhln, /among the foreigners/ otherwise called Rossiani, the Moskali or the Moskvichi. The others, the people of the south, are the Little Russians, the Yugorusi (1), or, /51/ according

1. Russians of the south.

to a more recent appellation, the Ukrainians.

S.P. T.R. 101 Up until now there is no agreement as to the names to be used. The Great Russians and the foreigners, conforming to tradition, most frequently use the expressions: Great Russians, Little Russians, bearing in mind the historic name of Little Russia (excepting Galicia and Vladimir). The appellation of Iugorusi is less frequently encountered (for example in Pypin and in Kostomarov). The Little Russians do not care for these two names and forsome time have preferred that of Ukrainians. The Galicians employ the term Rusin with the adjective 'ruski' opposed to Rossianin, 'rossisky' for the Great Russians. This name has been adopted beyond the Russian borders, but it has not been accepted within them. The Gorals of Galicia willingly call themselves Rusniaks. The Germans, following the Latin, use the form 'Ruthenian' S.P. T.R. which also has been admitted into French. The conflicts between the two nationalities have engendered ironic and insulting appellations. 578 Thus the Ukrainians call the Great Russians "Katsapy" (Goat-head, 186 because of their beard) or Khazars, and the latter call the Ukrainians "Khokli" (from Khokhol, "top-knot," because of the manner in which the Cossacks formerly dressed their hair).

Thus there is conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. This interesting conflict has very old and quite /52/natural causes. The differentiation between the Russians of the north and of the south occurred a long time ago; it has developed little by little, but without pause. Furthermore, there have been grievances and misunderstandings for a very long time between Great Russia and the Ukraine, and their entire life has been completely distinct throughout

S.P. T.R. 578 186 centuries. However, formerly the conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, did not exist in its present day sense. On the contrary, the two parts had a sense of kinship, or even of unity, as may be seen in an examination of the motives for which Bohdan Khmelnitskyj gave himself to Moscow and to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich (in 1653), after detaching the Ukraine from Poland.

S.P. T.R. 578 668 The conflict between the two Russian nations did not in fact break out until the Nineteenth Century.

Its basic causes were:

1. The efforts of the Ukrainians to create or to revive a language and a literature of their own.

2. A whole series of scientific discussions upon the question as to what were the connections between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, especially from a linguistic and an anthropological viewpoint.

Finally and above all:

3. The actual political and social status of the Ukrainians in the Empire and the general development in these latter years of social and democratic ideas.

/53/ Thus today the conflict is moving more and more from the literary and scientific field into the political field.

S.P. T.R. 578 668 538 The conflict began in 1798, when J.P. Kotljarevs'kji published in Ukrainian his Aeneid. From that date on there has been a great effort to create an indigenous literature. But these tendencies were quickly opposed by the government, which feared that this literary separatism might be prejudicial to national unity. And upon various occasions, especially in 1847, 1863, and 1876, it was forbidden to print or publish, save for a few rare exceptions, books in Ukrainian. But the result of these prohibitions was completely opposite from that which was intended. The tendencies toward literary emancipation asserted themselves so much the more strongly as they were more rigorously suppressed, and they found favorable soil in eastern Galicia, which belongs, as we know, to Austria.

5.P. T.R. 197 314 329 On the other hand, the conflict, strengthened by the scientific discussions concerning the ties between the two nations, became aggravated. There were arguments about the antiquity of the Ukrainian idiom, especially in the Kiyev region, about the question of

[Between Great Russians and Ukrainians, cf. pp. 116, 134-35-37 Ans.]

1: Niederle--108 E-5 1911 EK Slavic Peoples E16
Serbs EF6
Croats EF4

S.P. Cr. 35. 715 162

in 12. During the first years which followed the Austrian occupation, emigration was quite considerable; it still continues, but it is slowing down. The official figures for 1906 give 590,900 Mohammedans, 760,000 Orthodox, and 360,000 Catholics. Mr. Florinskii figures for the entire Balkens 820,000 Mohammedan Serbs.

In Dalmatia in 1900 there were 96,279 Orthodox, 496,778 Catholics which gives 16.2% and 83.6%. The other Austrian areas are Catholic (Istria 99.6%, the seacoast 98.5%). In Croatia and in Slavonia there are 1,721,416 Catholics, and 616,518 Orthodox, that is 71.2% and 25.5%. The total figures for the censuses of Budapest and Zagreb are not completely in accord, but the proportion remains the same. In Montenegro, according to Vrbanic, there are 87.5% Orthodox, 3.1% Catholics, and 9.3% Mohammedans whom Vrbanic considers as Slavs.

S.P. Cr. 36. 212

From the viewpoint of education /173/ the Serbo-Croats are very much behind. Throughout Austrian territory the number of illiterates reaches 74.14%, in Croatia 54.4% and even 56%, if one is to believe the Hungarian statistics. It is especially Dalmatia which is backward. In 1900, 64.8% of the men and 86.6% of the women did not know how to read or write. Teaching is also greatly neglected in Istria and still more in the Balkan countries about which we do not have any documentation except in the Serbian statistics. There are in Serbia only 21.3% literate (55% in the towns and 15% in the villages).

S.P. Cr. 36. 162

With regard to occupations, the Serbs and the Croats are primarily an agricultural people. In Istria and in Dalmatia there are 86.9% farmers (industry 4.6%, commerce 3.8%, public services 4.7%). In Bosnia-Hercegovina 88.34%. In the Kingdom of Serbia 85.23% of the population devote themselves to agriculture and to raising cattle.

S.P. Cr. 36. 578

S 32. Internal Differentiation.--The Serbs and the Croats do not differ greatly either from the physical viewpoint, or from that of linguistics or in the manner of living. Differences have been created solely by the political situation, by religion, and by literature. There are, however, certain shades of differences and certain special groups which we mentioned a short time ago.[4]

S.P. Cr. 36. 44

From the anthropological viewpoint there is, a far as we know at present, a much greater /174/ difference between the Serbo-Croats and the other Slavs than between the Serbs and the Croats

[4] [cf. cat. 116, pp. 92-95, pp. 105-106, p. 107--Analyst]

1: Niederle--112 E-5 1911 Slavic Peoples E16
Serbs EF6
Croats DF5
Montenegrins EF5

S.P. M. 101

finds the Hercegovinians who came from Hercegovina; then to /179/ the northeast the Brda (1) and between the sea and the lake of Skadar (Scutari) the Crna Gora (Black Mountain), so-called, with the Krajna. In Montenegrin Hercegovina there are seven tribes: Grahovo, the Banjani, Opushna, Rudina, Nikticke Rudine, Nikticka Zupa, Piva, Drobnjaci, Saranci. In the region of Brda there live seven tribes which are, beginning from the west: (2) the Bjelopavlici, the Piperi, the [illegible]

1. This word in Serbian means "mountains." Translator.

S.P. M. [444]

2. According to Hassert and Kovacevic, the Kuci are of the Albanian race, according to Erdelianovic, of the Serbian race. A certain number of them, the Drekanovici, present a strong mixture of Albanian blood. Erdelianovic considers certain among them (the Boukimirs) as Slavisized Romans.

Bratonozici, the Kuteki, the Vasojevici, the Moracani, the Rovcani. In ancient Montenegro four nahias are distinguished, each of which is divided into tribes: the nahia of Katun (Cetiniani, or people of Cetinie, Njeguchi, Zeknici, Couce, Kcevo, Ozrinici, Bielice, Komani, Zasarcani, Pjeshivtsi, Lukovo), the nahia Ljeshanska (Zecani), the nahia of Rieka (Cekliniani, Liubotinjani); the nahia of Crmnitsa contains a whole series of little tribes called "brotherhoods." In an area which was previously Serbian there are settled today Albanian and Serbian Mohammedans whose principal tribes are those of the Mrkojevici and of the Mikulici, close to Antivari (Bar).

S.P. M. [443]

According to Zanetov, there is still another special tribe, that /180/ of Siren, on the upper reaches of the Lim and of the Bosnian Bistrica.

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We have attempted to show the respective situations of the Croats and the Serbs, the difference in their political development despite their close kinship, the divergent tendencies, which, as a result of their historic traditions, they both follow with a view to assuring their future.

S.P. 578 Cf. 186

Up to the present, numerous conflicts have occurred between these two groups, and one would be mistaken in believing that the relative calm which prevails today is a guarantee of tolerance and peace. Leaving aside the double ideal of a great Croatia and a great Serbia, an contradictory ideal if there ever was one, we run into an entire series of delicate questions, of conflicts which are constantly aggravated. They are met with in Croatia-Slavonia, in Dalmatia

[i.e. Serbs and Croats -- Analyst]

1: Niederle--113 E-5 1911 E16 Slavic Peoples E16
Serbs E F6
Croats E F6
Bulgaria E F1

S.P. 578 Cr. 36 186 (for example Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and especially in Bosnia. This province is truly an apple of discord between these two national groups. Here the Austrian government is attempting to do things somewhat by chance without having a clearly defined idea regarding nationality.

000 What will come of this? What will happen to the country after the annexation? What will be the new relations between Croats and Serbs? We cannot yet tell today.

From the viewpoint of science and of the Slav idea, one should at least proceed with honesty and not shut one's eyes to the true facts. At the outset it would be necessary to determine through an accurate census the relative situation of the Serbs and the Croats and to treat with justice all of the national and political groups. Furthermore, it will no longer be necessary to invent a third Croato-Serbian nation, the Bosnian (1) nation, as was conceived of by the

1. Certainly, the concept of a Bosnian nation existed before. One may read in the twelfth century chronicle of Kinnamos: "Bosthna...ethos idia para taute zon," (Bosnia... is a nation living by itself), and one often finds that the Bosnians are considered to be a nation. But this designation, which was based upon political considerations, is no longer justified.

Kallay government a few years ago. Moreover, this innovation was in no wise successful. Since 1907, the official designation "Bosnian" has been replaced by the correct designation "Serbo-Croat."

## VIII

## THE BULGARS

S.P. B. 101 S 33. Historical Introduction. ---The last Slav people produced by the differentiation of the South-Slav group, is the Bulgars.

Almost all of them live on the Balkan peninsula.

S.P. B. 101 174 Like the other South-Slavs they had their cradle much farther north, somewhere, near the Carpathians, in the vicinity of the Russians. Between the third and the fifth century, they abandoned the Carpathians, began to push through the Thracian and Scytho-Sarmatian tribes, towards the lower Danube, and in the sixth century reached the Balkans. At this time the Slavic tribes of the Peninsula did not have a common ethnic name. They were called Slavs like their neighbors the Serbs

6:1 Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



favoured Bulgaria's Macedonian claim. Yet they refused to associate themselves with the efforts of the Serbian Government to restore the former Patriarchate of Petch. But, if their preference went to Bulgaria, it was because the latter was one day to open to them the route to Constantinople. So the realism of the Sofia Cabinet practised an intermittent Russophilia. Two-thirds of the governing classes of the Bulgarian nation were pupils of Russia, but their number also included some Russophobes—Stambulov, Marinov, Chanadiev (except at the end of his life), Radoslavov and his associates. The Slavonic idea found an indefatigable apostle in the person of Stevan Bobtchev, a volunteer of the 1877 War, a jurist, professor, and diplomat, who presided over the Slav Congress at Sofia in 1910, when the Neo-Slavism of Kramář and Miloukov triumphed. But currents of dissension appeared on various occasions, especially in the reactions in favour of Catholicism at the time of Marinov, and in the reminder of the Tartar or Finno-ugrian origins of the Bulgarian nation, every time they entered into conflict with Russia.

The Russophilia of the Serbs often took on the aspect of a quasi-religious veneration. But it did not cause them to forget that the Tsarist government had abandoned them on several occasions. Apart from the pro-Bulgarian attitude it maintained in the Macedonian question, it agreed to the annexation of Bosnia at the time of the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal interview in Buchlau (Sept. 16, 1908) and, later on, its ambassador, Benckendorff, signed the secret agreements in London (April 26, 1915) which, by ceding to Italy the eastern coasts of the Adriatic, bade fair to ruin the plans for Jugoslav unity.

Now this unity had been a fixed idea with all Serbian statesmen since the Battle of Sadowa, which had awakened as many hopes in Serbia as in Italy. As long ago as July 30, 1866, Garachanin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said to Botmiliau, France's representative in Belgrade, 'No matter what efforts diplomacy may make, in reality, the Austrian Empire no longer exists. Three nationalities will arise in its place, the Hungarian, Bohemian, and Slav (Yugoslav). Sooner or later, the Austrian Germans will join the other German peoples. . . . The Turkish Empire will fall, as the Austrian Empire has done. The Yugoslav State will be founded—not without warfare, perhaps, but it

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was obliged to join the European concert which forced Montenegro to raise the siege of Scutari.

Russian society took no interest in these questions. Its members were frequently heard to say, 'God bless these "bratouchki"! Wouldn't it be better to live without them? Shan't we be happier when we have abandoned the Slavonic chimera and the dream of providential vocation, and think only of our own immediate interests?'

With the crisis of July, 1914, Russia was, for the third time, faced with the possibility of a renunciation. This time she pulled herself together. Austria was imposing on her a trial of strength in which her rank as a Great Power was at stake. On learning of the ultimatum from the Ballplatz to the Belgrade Cabinet, Nicholas II telegraphed to his minister, 'Tell the Serbs they can count on me'. With this historic sentence, another cycle in the history of the Slavonic world was closed.

In fact, under a common denominator of origin, of sufferings and reflexes, the Slavonic peoples were inspired by different aims —independence, territorial expansion, and the acquisition of sovereign rights. Consequently, every event which brought them nearer to their respective goals had, as its first result, the relaxation or removal of their connecting bonds. It was the negative aspect of Slavism, which, having reached the stage of realisation, animated ideals which involved neither the same aims nor the same volitional power. This had been proved during the Balkan War of 1912–1913, when Serbs and Bulgarians fell upon each other, after having jointly waged war on the Turks. It was to be seen even more clearly during the World War of 1914–1918, when, some fighting under the flags of the Entente, others under those of the Central Empires, the Slavs exhausted each other in fratricidal conflict.

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*Chapter Three*

# THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIONALITIES, OR SLAVISM WITHOUT RUSSIA

THE 1914–1918 War has often been regarded as a settling of accounts between Slavs and Teutons. And it was certainly the Germans who did the most to popularise this over-simplified viewpoint. At the time of the Balkan crisis, Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor of the Reich, reduced the possibility of a European war to a struggle between Teutonism and Slavism: *Ein Kampf zwischen Germanentum und Slawentum.* For his part, General von Moltke wrote, on February 12, 1913: 'Sooner or later will come the war between Germanism and Slavism, for which all the standard-bearers of Germanic culture and spirit must prepare'.

At the time when it was formulated, this prophecy might have been found surprising. Indeed, in the course of the ages Teutonism had secured solid positions against the Slavs, whom, in nine centuries, it had pushed back from the Elbe to the Vistula. It had colonised, plundered, or subdued their western tribes. It penetrated into Russia by two means—the Baltic nobility, and dynastic marriages. Eleven Tsars or Tsarinas since Peter the Great were either of German blood or under German matrimonial influence. This fact alone will give an idea of the fatality which, since the eighteenth century, weighed upon the destiny of Russia. In face of this infiltration, we think of the terrible phrase addressed by Skobelev to a delegation of Serbian students in Paris: 'In our own country, we are not at home'. In short, history presented itself to the Teutons as an uninterrupted process of absorption of their eastern neighbours, or of domination over their politics.

Moreover, von Moltke's prophecy implied a Slav solidarity which was then in the realm of conjecture. History offered no recent example of it. In 1848, the Slavs had nearly all fought for a cause which was foreign to, even if not opposed to, Slavism. In 1885, and again in 1913, the Serbs and the Bulgars had cut each others' throats. And twelve months later, in 1914,

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186* 578 175 the Slavs were to split up between the two camps into which Europe would be divided. So that, except in congresses, where ethnography and philology were discussed, this solidarity remained a myth. Russian egoism bore heavily upon the little 'Pravoslav' countries, in which the Tsarist policy affected to take an interest. Much more than that; certain territories, caught between two Slavonic currents—such as Macedonia, the Ukrainian Marches, the Teschen district of Silesia—kept alive the spirit of dissidence within the Slavonic family.

175 167 What remained of von Moltke's declarations was the obsession of an inevitable reckoning between the two races. Germany, who, from age to age, had extended her sphere of domination at the expense of the Slavs, dimly felt that, one fine day, the latter would grow tired of the role of 'fertilisers' (*Düngervolk*) to which the Pan-Germanic school condemned them. In Merovingian times, a slow but continuous migration, by easy stages, peopled the Eastern Teutonic states with Slavs. These tribes had reached the Elbe and the Oder by the fourth century. To designate the Teutonic peoples, they forged the collective appellation, *Niemtse*, which has remained in the modern vocabulary of the Slavonic peoples, and signifies 'dumb ones', *i.e.*, speaking a language unintelligible to Slavs. But, little by little, the ebb of the Teutonic tribes pushed them back. With the exception of a few descendants of the Pomeranians (the Kachoubes and the Slovinces) and of the Sorabes (Lusatians), the vast group of Western Slavs of the Elbe and the Baltic disappeared in the struggle waged against them by the Germans in the four centuries from the time of Charlemagne to the twelfth century.

829 167 181 This withdrawal is explained by the state of dissension—a hereditary defect with the Slavs—in which these populations lived. An Austrian historian of this century, J. Peisker,[1] was so struck by such a large-scale backward drive, that he sought a different explanation for it. The past, he said, shows such a succession of conquests, and establishments of Teutonism in Slavonic territory, that we cannot attribute it to the fortune of war. We are obliged to suppose the existence of some factor which paralysed the resistance of the Slavs. This factor must

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[1] *Die Älteren Beziehungen der Slawen zu Turkotataren und Germanien.* Berlin, 1905.

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But a new Slavonic problem was brought to the forefront—the problem of the Ukraine. A Ukrainian National Committee was formed, and began to negotiate with the Allies. Its action divided the Slavs; Poles and Russians greeted it with equal hostility; the Yugoslavs displayed disapproval or indifference; the Czechs adopted a half-and-half attitude, advocating the administrative and cultural autonomy of the Ukraine within the framework of the reviving Slav solidarity.

Moreover, it was quite natural that, once in possession of their ethno-linguistic frontiers, the Slavonic peoples should cease to have any other horizons than these frontiers, within which they still had to build up a political, economic, and social organisation. They sought their vocation in their own history. We are continually forced back to this fundamental fact—Slavism has been, in its essence and from the force of circumstances, a revolt of the nation against the State, whether the latter was called Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Turkey. In Russia itself, the Slavophile school maintained the rights of the country (*zemlia*) against the encroachments of the State. With this tendency is connected the tinge of anarchy which the West is apt to associate with the word 'Slav'. The nation, in the spirit of the 1919–1920 treaties, being identified with the State, the Slavonic idea was doomed to lose the centrifugal opposition, the dissolving power which had long characterised it, and under whose action the Habsburg Empire had collapsed.

And in fact, the triumph of the nationalities, ratified by the treaties of Saint-Germain and of Trianon, restored Slavism to its academic origins. Reminders of racial fraternity now seemed to serve no other purpose than to warm up the atmosphere for after-dinner speeches, or for inaugural meetings of congresses. The Slavonic nations lacked that basis of common culture which gives to Hispanism, for instance, the only positive value to which it can lay claim.

In the political order the counter-indications showed up all the more clearly, inasmuch as the territorial settlements were no longer made in virtue of force, but on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. Now there were some populations which were caught between two opposing Slavonic currents; the Teschen district of Silesia, Macedonia, the Ukraine. A cynic has remarked that, the farther the distance between Slavonic

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nations, the better they understand each other; witness the Poles and the Bulgarians, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. But to say that living side by side no more ensures agreement among nations than it does among individuals is to state a commonplace.

Yet the reshuffling of the map did, nevertheless, satisfy the essential aspirations of the Slavs. It gave Yugoslavia her unity, Czechoslovakia her independence, Poland her liberty. But some irredentism still remained. Bulgaria claimed Macedonia (although she had lost it before the war). The Yugoslavs regretted that the Slovenes of Istria and Carinthia had remained outside the frontiers of their State, Poland remained in dispute with Russia on her Eastern Marches, and with Czechoslovakia in the Teschen Basin. The Ukraine question was assuming a fresh form and acuteness. Even after the recasting of Eastern Europe, there still remained seeds of discord between the Slavonic nations.

Much more; looked at as a whole, the new map seemed to be based on an age-long law which shuts the Slavs off from the sea. It was because it was cut off from all the seas that the original Slavia remained as unknown to the Ancients as Central Africa was to the Europeans of fifty years ago. One after the other the Scythians, the Sarmatians, the Goths, the Huns, the Avars, the Khazars, the Tartars, all barred them from the Black Sea. It was not until the eighteenth century that the Russians became effective masters of the northern shore of this sea. Similarly with the Baltic, where Scandinavian, Finnish, and Baltic peoples settled; until the Second World War, Leningrad was a Slavonic breach in Finnish territory. As for the White Sea, it was inaccessible to the Russians before the sixteenth century. The Finns, and perhaps the Lapps, had got in before them.

Now the 1919–1920 treaties took the Baltic territories and Finland from Russia. They refused Danzig to Poland, Fiume and Trieste to Yugoslavia. Following the coasts of the Baltic, from the borders of Esthonia to the Free Port of Danzig there was no real Slavonic port, even though the hinterland might be entirely populated with Slavs. On the Adriatic, the Dalmatian coast offered nothing but indifferent outlets, backed by steep slopes—and yet the hinterland was wholly Slavonic. The Aegean had no Slavonic outlet. The Slavs were allowed no possibility of becoming maritime powers, capable of rivalling the Germanic,

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Anglo-Saxon, or Latin nations. The treaties of the earlier war had thus sanctioned a traditional exclusiveness in this respect.

On the other hand, Slavism scored a point—the only one—in an acquisition of territory. This was achieved by the clauses which allocated to the Czechs Sub-Carpathian Russia—an ethnical mosaic, with predominant Russian or Ukrainian elements, which was to form an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic. This allocation, demanded by the Ruthenians of America, was decided upon chiefly because the signatories to the treaties considered the Prague government as the best mentor they could give to a dangerously backward Slavonic population. Indeed, Czechoslovakia was, within a few years, to improve Sub-Carpathia, that Cinderella of the Slavonic world; at the cost of heavy budgetary sacrifices, she turned this territory entrusted to her into a real 'Civilisation Front'.

As is well known, at the Peace Conference the Czechoslovaks intervened—another gesture of pure Slavonic inspiration—to try to secure for the Serbs of Lusatia the benefit of the protection accorded to minorities. These Lusatians are the remnant of a powerful tribe who people a corner of Saxony and Brandenburg, with its centre at Bautzen. Theirs was for long the *terra incognita* of the Slavonic world; they were discovered by the learned circles of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the nineteenth century.

The return of Poland to an independent life, and the Sovietisation of the Russian State, modified the nature of the relations between the two peoples. Immediately after the earlier war and the Treaty of Riga, one could not say that these relations had been clarified. It is certain that the Government of Moscow was then pursuing a Eurasiatic policy, which drew it away from European affairs. But no one could imagine that this disinterestedness would last very long. In Moscow they still, as under the Tsars, spoke of the 'Jesuitism' and the 'Jagellonism' of the Poles; in Warsaw, they talked about the hegemonic appetite of Russia, and her propaganda. 'Atheism' and 'Marxism' had replaced 'Orthodoxy' and 'Panslavism' as passwords.

The Polish-Sovietic War of 1920 complicated inter-Slav relations. The Poles bitterly reproached the Czechs with having refused

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to allow the passage through their territory of reinforcements which the Poles were expecting from abroad. They complained no less bitterly at seeing the Czechs, like the Yugoslavs, model their attitude towards them on their own behaviour towards Moscow. It is true that Prague and Belgrade had enthusiastically greeted the resurrection of Poland, following the Allies' victory—a very different result from the changes in 1916, which, for the Poles, had substituted the duty to fight beside the Central Empires, for the right to do so. But in 1920, in these same capitals, they were wondering whether Poland was fighting Bolshevism or the Russian nation, and this differentiation, which inspired many newspapers, was regarded in Warsaw as definitely unfriendly. The ex-Minister of Poland in Yugoslavia, Erasmus Piltz, felt it necessary to address this warning to the Yugoslavs: 'Nothing separates us: on the contrary, everything unites us. . . . There is not a Pole who does not consider the alliance with Yugoslavia as a most highly fruitful and desirable achievement. But, if one of the most popular Serbian propagandists does not hesitate to claim that Polish-Yugoslav relations must depend on our relations with Russia, then I feel I may say, without fear of contradiction, that no Polish government, no Polish party, will accept such reservations, or such a presentation of the question'.

The leader-writer of *Przeglad Wisczorny* mournfully summed-up the origins of this misunderstanding: 'In Warsaw, we have been in the habit of viewing Serbia through Viennese or Budapest spectacles, whilst the Serbs have observed us through Russian spectacles. And the result is that each side has a false picture of the other'.[3]

Finally, a conception of their own greatness, dear to the Poles, helped to foster a feeling of friction between them and the sister nations, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—which the Poles considered as being on a lower hierarchical plane than themselves—for were they not a Great Power? Perhaps we shall not be far wrong in affirming that between the two wars the Poles maintained more regular, if not more cordial, relations with the Rumanians and the Hungarians than with the other Slavonic states.

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[3] Of May 22, 1920.

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721 648 175 in Danzig; German criminals, dressed in Polish uniforms, attacked German villages in Upper Silesia to provide Hitler with the pretext for an invasion. This was launched on September 1, at 5-45 a.m. The curtain was raised for the greatest drama in history.

186* 578 648 But, beyond this, the historian who, with these facts as his starting-point, sought to establish synchronism between the feeling of a common destiny among the Slavs and the great wars of the twentieth century would very soon conclude that no such feeling existed. At all times of threatened crisis, there have appeared more or less general impulses towards *rapprochement*; the first result of all actual crises has been to set the Slavs one against the other. In this Second World War, as in that of 1914–1918, we were again to find the Bulgars, the Croats, and the Slovaks ranged with Germany, Bohemia trampled upon, Poland quartered, Serbia crucified, Russia at grips with the Teutonic colossus.

Much more: the Slavs participated in the spoils. Poland rewarded herself at Czechoslovakia's expense, Russia at Poland's, and Bulgaria at Serbia's.

175 648 721 Just as the 1914–1918 war had started with the crushing of Serbia, so that of 1939 had as its prologue the carving-up of Czechoslovakia. The latter succumbed to the fate which had forced her to look for support to the Western Democracies, with whom she had no territorial connection, and whose diplomacy, wavering or swept along by the back-wash of internal policy, had been able neither to ensure peace nor to provide for war. The inconsequentiality of France, signing a pact with Moscow, then hastening to evade its consequences, encouraging Yugoslavia to be on her guard against Fascist megalomania, then signing the Four-Power Pact and observing it no more than she had done the previous pacts; all this culminated in the Munich Pact, which—whether justified or not by our military unpreparedness—completed the state of confusion among the nations for whom France was the greatest asset in peace as in war.

It was not only by its inaugural phase—the dismembering of Czechoslovakia and the aggression against Poland—that the war once again seemed destined to become a reckoning between Slavs and Teutons. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had reproached

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occupied by the Russian armies would be entrusted to the Committee.

It will be noticed that in both documents the word 'Government' was avoided. No doubt that explains why neither London nor Washington received notification of the establishment of this new organism. But the Poles in London reacted indignantly. For them, this new institution was juridically valueless and, in practice, without authority. They declared that out of the fifteen members composing this Executive Directory seven were unknown, while eight were notorious Communists. The President, M. Osubka-Morawski, was a thirty-five year old workman, excluded from the Socialist Party in 1940 on account of his affiliations with Moscow. They therefore asked London and Washington to disavow these 'usurpers'.

Russia's might, and the role of the Soviet armies in the joint military effort, scarcely permitted an unfriendly attitude in regard to an initiative to which the Soviets had already given their sanction. London had not, for years, 'hedged' over misunderstandings which set the London and the Moscow exiles at loggerheads, only to take a final decision just when the Russian armies were achieving advances which left their allies far behind. So London simply announced that Great Britain continued to recognise M. Mikolajczyk's Government, whilst hoping that it would find some way of coming to an agreement with the organisation which had been set up in opposition to it. In the United States, where the Polish question caused very violent discussion during an election year, Mr. Cordell Hull entrenched himself in the silence which was his usual refuge when he was questioned concerning Eastern European problems.

In view of this negative attitude on the part of London and Washington, M. Mikolajczyk decided to seek an interview with Marshal Stalin. He went to Moscow, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Romer. But his interview only served to make him realise the insurmountable prejudices which Soviet circles cherished against the London exiles.

Yet the Allies could not allow the Polish question to remain in this state of uncertainty just when a general settlement of the war was within sight. So this question was included on the agenda of the Crimean Conference in February, 1945. The Three Powers decided that the evolution of the international

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situation necessitated the creation of a new Polish Provisional Government on a wider democratic basis than that which had governed the establishment of the organism which functioned in the liberated regions of Poland (first the Lublin, then the Warsaw Government). M. Molotov and the ambassadors of Great Britain and the United States received a mandate to carry out this reorganisation in conjunction with the members of the Provisional Government and the Polish democratic leaders both in Poland and abroad. This new Provisional Government would, as soon as circumstances permitted, organise free elections with a secret poll.

The Yalta decision provoked a split in Polish circles in London. The Government-in-exile, at the head of which M. Arciszewski had replaced M. Mikolajczyk, declared that neither that Government nor the Polish nation would recognise the decision; but M. Mikolajczyk and the Peasant Party, the majority of the Christian Democrats, and nearly half the Socialists, immediately signified that they would have nothing to do with this uncompromising attitude.

On April 21, 1945, whilst awaiting the application of the Yalta decisions, the Warsaw Polish Government, presided over by M. Osubka-Morawski, signed a treaty of friendship and mutual aid with the Soviet Government. This confirmed the Russian point of view, according to which the Warsaw Cabinet remained the nucleus of the future reconstructed Government. 'This reconstruction', said Marshal Stalin in a declaration to *The Times*, 'will have the effect of favouring a policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union instead of a policy of a "sanitary cordon" directed against her'. Moscow remembered the experience of 1919 and the 'barbed wire fence'.

At Yalta, the desire for prudence by which Mr. Roosevelt was inspired meant that the procedure in connection with the enlarging of the Polish Government was left very vague. Hence Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow in order, among other things, to set this procedure in action. As the result of the Stalin-Hopkins interview, a Soviet note was sent on June 13 convening in Moscow the Three Power Commission and the representatives of the Warsaw Government, together with the Polish leaders abroad.

The forwarding of this note had been speeded up in the hope

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of enabling Poland to be admitted, at least *in extremis*, to the San Francisco Conference. For as the result of London and Washington's refusal, on April 18, to allow an invitation to be sent to the Warsaw Government, it looked as though Poland, the first victim of German aggression, might be absent from the discussion of the statute destined to preserve the world against the recurrence of similar attacks.

The invitation found the London Poles divided. Of the three organisations invited, M. Mikolajczyk, ex-President of the Council, and M. Stanczyk, Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, accepted; M. Witos declined the invitation on health grounds, and M. Zakowski, the representative of the Socialist Party, reflected the discord which had apparently developed in that party by refusing to join the delegation.

The trial of sixteen Poles who had been detained in Moscow for several weeks, charged with sabotage and anti-Soviet activities, interfered with the negotiations. In vain did the Poles in London try to secure their release, by emphasising the role these men had played in the Resistance; Marshal Stalin declared that the Conference must not prevent the trial from taking place. At the hearing certain of the accused pleaded guilty to acts of terrorism directed against Soviet troops, and attributable to the *Armija krajowa* (Armed Forces of the Interior), which had been recognised on the previous August 30[1] by the English and the Americans, and to a political organisation called *Niepodlegosc* (Independence). The verdict returned on June 21[2] was mitigated; the chief offender, General Okulicki, was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, while the remaining accused were either acquitted or received very light sentences.

The objects of this trial, synchronised with the Conference from which, on principle, was to come the reconciliation of the Warsaw Poles and the London Poles, seem to have been as follows. Firstly, to discredit the leaders of the Government-in-exile and their staffs; secondly, to give (by the verdict) an example of the Russians' spirit of moderation; and thirdly, to emphasise their unshakeable determination to put an end, once for all, to anti-Soviet propaganda on Polish territory.

So the agreement reached on June 23[2] found the atmosphere

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648 175 cleared, and awakened a reasoned optimism in English and American circles.

642 175 Twenty-four hours after the arrival in Warsaw of the Poles invited by Moscow to join the new 'National Unity' Government the former Osubka-Morawski Cabinet resigned, and was reconstituted with the addition of these elements representing the exiles or the home Resistance movements.

The new Government included representatives of the Communist Party (which were not, as the London exiles maintained, in the majority) as well as of the Socialist, Peasant, and Democratic Parties. For the greater part it was composed of the ministers who had resigned from the Warsaw Cabinet. It kept at its head the ex-President, Osubka-Morawski, supported by two Vice-Presidents, MM. Gomulka and Mikolajczyk.

At the same time, the composition of the National Council—a sort of pre-Legislature—was also modified. Its Presidium, which played the role of provisional Chief of State, was under the leadership of M. Bierut, a Communist, who was, however, given two Vice-Presidents—M. Witos, leader of the Peasant Party, and Professor Grabski, National-Christian.

This Government declared that the first question on its agenda was that of repatriation of the Poles still residing abroad.

648 175 As soon as the formation of the National Unity Ministry was known, the British authorities negotiated with the former exiled Government in London, with a view to its prompt dissolution.

• [578] But on June 25[1] the Government-in-exile published a declaration, affirming that it refused to acknowledge any transmission of power, and proclaimed the new Warsaw Government to be 'illegal'. At the same time, it issued a manifesto to the Polish people justifying its attitude of protest, and declaring itself willing, as far as the fate of the country was concerned, to abide by a free election.

On July 5 London recognised the new Provisional Government, already approved by Moscow and Washington. This meant a break between the British authorities and the Cabinet-in-exile, which England had for so long supported and encouraged. The B.B.C. ceased to broadcast Polish programmes, and the various services installed in London were invited to wind up as quickly as possible.

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atheistic circles. But the international crisis which swept the country was complicated by a religious crisis. This became evident when the Council of Ministers decided, on September 17, to denounce the Concordat, accusing the Vatican of having violated its clauses by the publication, during the occupation, of laws contrary to its engagements (an allusion to the nomination of bishops of German nationality in Posnania).

Poland had lost the liberty of choice which, for so long, had enabled her to seek her equilibrium between the Teutonic and the Russian world. Willy-nilly, she had to accustom herself to the new state of affairs; but she brought to the situation the germ of serious civil discord. And her exiles, maintaining a more than century-old tradition, were to keep alive, especially in Anglo-American and in Catholic circles, an atmosphere of opposition—not to mention the clandestine resistance, all the centres of which were not extinct in Poland itself. Our grandchildren will talk of the 'Polish Question' just as our grandparents used to do.

* * *

In her foreign policy Bulgaria has a 'spare ideology' which enables her to reverse her international situation according to whether she is at peace or at war. Thus she periodically takes her stand beside the Power which seems able to help her to realise her territorial aspirations. This is the effect of that 'Macedonian psychosis' of which we have spoken. But her evil genius has invariably inspired her to 'back the wrong horse'.

In the Second World War, she passed through three phases.

Feeling sure that Germany was invincible, but profiting by her previous disappointments, she first tried to gain Hitler's support at the lowest possible price. This was the period of so-called 'passive belligerency', limited to platonic manifestations—adhesion to the Tripartite Pact and to the anti-Comintern Pact.

But the Axis soon saw through this ruse. In April, 1941, it allowed Bulgaria to settle in Western Macedonia (Serbia) and in Eastern Macedonia (Greece). In return, it expected its troops to have right of passage through and of quartering in Bulgarian territory. Such was the *leit-motiv* of the three interviews which took place between Hitler and King Boris, between March, 1941,

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in Yugoslavia, where it has two aspects: one external—that concerned with relations between Moscow and Belgrade, the other internal—the *entente* between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

The personality of Marshal Tito, who had the confidence of the Russians and was the animator, first of resistance to the Germans, then of the liberation movement, considerably simplified the question of relations between Yugoslavs and Soviets.

Before the soil of Yugoslavia had been liberated, a Government-in-exile (presided over, at the end, by Dr. Ivan Choubachich) continued to function in London, whilst in Yugoslavia Marshal Tito directed the war of liberation. During the winter of 1944–1945, King Peter II tried to bring about an agreement between Tito and the exiled Government. Various obstacles retarded the conclusion of the agreement, and they were later on to paralyse its enforcement.

These obstacles included the conduct of the King during the war. He was reproached with having lived far removed from his people and with not having imitated the example of his grandfather, King Peter I of Serbia, who in 1876 under the name of 'Peter Mrkognich', led a detachment of rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or his father, the Regent Alexander, who had fought in 1917–1918 on the Salonica front.

He was further reproached with his inopportune marriage, contracted far away from the country, and against the advice of his friends and counsellors. On March 21,° 1944, at the Yugoslav Embassy in London, he had married Princess Alexandra of Greece, who, on July 17 of the following year, gave birth to a son.

Now, in Serbia, dynastic loyalty is not (as in Croatia, for example) founded on any fundamental attachment to the monarchical idea. It exists simply in respect of the monarch's patriotic function—what the Serbs call *narodni rad* ('national work')—a name which takes on its full significance only in a country which is periodically reduced to slavery.

The authority of King Peter II was also weakened by the support he had given to General Draja Mihailovich. The latter had been the first to rise against the occupation, and his heroic resistance had rallied the best elements of the old army in Southern Bosnia and in Montenegro. But he was reproached

° March 20, according to Keesing (trans.).

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founded on despotism and personal power? The law of August 25, 1945 on the control of the press banned not only the ex-'collaborators', but also the publishers of 'alarmist' news or of news 'contrary to the general interest'—as conceived by the Government, naturally. A well-informed police organisation, modelled on Russian methods, ceaselessly exercised a very close watch over public opinion and, naturally, indulged in arbitrary arrests and acts of violence.

This policy led to dissension within the Government. The leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, Milan Grol, resigned on August 19[1]; on October 8[1] he was followed into retirement by Dr. Ivan Choubachich and the Minister Choutei, both Croat Agrarians.

Choubachich's resignation was serious, for it upset a ministerial equilibrium which had been agreed upon among the Allies. Yet what was this agreement worth, since Tito, repudiating the terms of the compromise which had sanctioned his authority, had pronounced against the monarchy? 'Not one of our combatants thought that anything new could be created under the leadership of the King, especially as the Nediches and Mihailoviches committed their crimes in his name. . . . The point is, whether the monarchy is compatible with the new system of Yugoslav Federal Democracy. . . . For several reasons, I think it is not'.

The next day (August 8, 1945) King Peter replied to this declaration by withdrawing from the Regents the power they held from him.

Tito was not intimidated by this retort. He declared that the Government acted in agreement with all the creative and constructive forces of the country, with all sincerely democratic parties. The masses of the populace had acquired, during the war, firmly-rooted political knowledge which had nothing in common with the electoral catchwords with which they previously used to be taken in.

The Opposition replied that free elections would prove the truth of this assertion, whereas those to which the country had been called were not free. The Americans and the English repeatedly emphasised the reserves they made regarding their attitude towards the régime which would result from this poll.

The elections took place on November 11.[1] They gave to the

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National Front 80–90 per cent of the votes cast.[4] It is true that the Opposition abstained from voting (its Belgrade organ, *Demokratia*, was suspended) and that the electoral system favoured the Coalition Government. But the Anglo-Americans took no action. They declared the results of the poll to be 'acceptable'. On these results were based the two Assemblies (Union Assembly and Assembly of the Nationalities) which, following Russian lines, were to control the country's constitutional life.

In short, both at home and abroad, Tito was master of the situation. He had armed forces, the levers of control, fanatical partisans, a 'Youth' following, attached to a régime which had radically reorganised the whole staffing of the army, the administrative services, and diplomacy. But certain large sections of opinion were not with him. In the provinces the old parties were still solidly rooted. Those circles criticised the 'personal' and 'plebiscite' character of the régime, which was an unprecedented innovation in Serbian political life. Against the Marshal were the Monarchists, the old army, Serbian nationalism, Croat particularism, Slovene 'Clericalism'. For a long time he alienated the Catholic clergy; on October 18, Radio-Vatican broadcast a letter from the Yugoslav bishops to the Belgrade Government, accusing the latter of systematically persecuting the Roman Church.

And this was only criticism of internal affairs. Tito was further reproached with having reorganised relations between the Yugoslav populations on anachronistic bases. How would this State turn out—a State of twelve million inhabitants, with six autonomous Governments, capped with a Federal Government? Where would the frontiers of Croatia and Serbia be? And those of Serbia and Macedonia? Could the Macedonian question be considered as settled by the granting of autonomy? And would not the Bulgaro-Yugoslav *entente*, advertised as a victory for the régime, be submitted to a severe test when autonomy gave rise to political disputes in this country which, for a century, had been torn by undercurrents of passion and foreign intrigue? Was

[4] According to official statistics, out of 8,383,455 electors and 7,413,214 votes cast, 6,574,975 went to the National Front. The franchise had been given to women; the electoral age had been lowered to 18, and even lower for those who had fought in the liberation.

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the resurrection of Montenegro, a country of 200,000 inhabitants, which had disappeared since 1918, and of Bosnia, which had not been heard of in history since the Middle Ages, in keeping with the ideas of a 'new world' that were current in Tito's circle? And had not Tito himself, by liberating atomic nationalisms, super-Balkanised his country at a time when means of communication were suppressing distances—in other words, had he not inaugurated a policy which was opposed to history, progress, and common sense, in order to realise the midsummer night's dream of a Slavophile of the 'Forties'?

The federal régime, it will be said, has representatives in Europe—Switzerland, Russia, Austria. But Switzerland has maturity, Russia has extent, Austria has an historical and cultural homogeneity to safeguard its unity.

Was not the Yugoslav community in imminent danger from this 'State power' given to regions hitherto divided by so many memories? The Croats used to oppose the Serbs in religious matters. Between the two wars, rivalry between Catholics and Orthodox had subsided somewhat. But the elections in Austria and Hungary showed that, after the liberation, the attachment of the populations of Central Europe to the Roman Church had lost none of its force. Croatia—*antemurale Christianitatis*—could not escape this deeply-rooted tendency, still less at a time when Russia, the protectress of the Yugoslav State, reaffirmed the Orthodox tradition on which her relations with the Serbs had formerly been based. How was it possible not to see in this renewal of religious antagonism between Belgrade and Zagreb a threat of secession?

In Yugoslavia the Crown used to be (as in Belgium) the link between different peoples, traditions, and trends. On November 29, 1945, obedient to Tito's watchword, the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly, composed of the Union Assembly and the Assembly of the Nationalities, proclaimed the Federative Republic. It deposed and condemned to exile the dynasty of the Karageorgevich.

This vote was the logical conclusion of the elections and also —it must be admitted—of the errors of the young King. The latter raised a protest which was greeted, in London circles, with more sympathy than encouragement. The fate of the monarchy in Yugoslavia seemed, indeed, to be definitely settled.

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A sceptic might have observed that, despite the oratorical manifestations of harmony and goodwill, three specifically Slav problems which had arisen in 1919 still appeared on the agenda of questions at issue in 1946—the allocation of the Teschen Basin, the definitive status of Macedonia, the fate of the Lusatian Serbs.

Indeed, the Macedonian question does not seem to have been finally settled by the creation of a Macedonian Republic within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation. That is why, at the end of 1946, Yugoslav newspapers demanded the incorporation of the Bulgarian districts (Petrich, Gornya-Djumaïa, Nevrekop) in the Popular Republic of Macedonia, and reproached the new Bulgarian constitution with submitting every project for the transfer of territory to the decision of the legislature—a step which Belgrade considered as a stipulation derogatory to the 'Macedonian minority's' right to self-determination.[2] In other words, in Yugoslavia the Macedonian population of Bulgaria was still considered as non-Bulgarian in character. Latent, but still discernible, it was the old quarrel which had, for half a century, set the two peoples in opposition to each other. It was recalled in the Sobranje on December 12, by an Agrarian Deputy, who asked the Government whether it did not consider the Yugoslav claims as an interference in Bulgarian Home Affairs. And early in 1947 a much-talked-of action brought at Skoplje plainly pointed to the survival of the famous ORIM (Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organisation) directed by Vanka Mihaïlov—that organisation which had been so widely discussed at the conclusion of the previous war.

[2] An action which the French Press Agency described (on January 27, 1947) as 'typically Macedonian' was brought against Albanians, Yugoslavs of Albanian or Turkish origin and 'real Macedonians', accused of having organised, in 1945, an illegal society—*National Chiptare Demokratia*—to overthrow the Albanian Government of Enver Hodja and set up a 'Great Albania', including a part of Western Macedonia, with Kossovo and Metova. The conspirators were in league with Mihaïlov's Revolutionary Committee—the famous ORIM (Macedonian International Revolutionary Organisation), whose hand had already been detected in a separatist Macedonian plot which had been judged in November 1946. In this plot was involved no less a person than Metodijé Andorov Cento, one of the most popular figures among the Macedonian 'partisans' and, up to the spring of 1946, President of the Macedonian Liberation Assembly. Cento was sentenced to eleven years' hard labour. Decorated by Tito, he was in opposition to the Government, criticising its Communist affiliations, and in conflict with Lazar Koulichevsky, Prime Minister of the Macedonian legislature.

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war, now had only three—Russia, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. One aspect of her new position which represented an innovation was her transformation into a great maritime nation, thanks to the three ports, Stettin, Gdynia, and Danzig, and to her 312 miles of coast-line. Nevertheless, her destiny would henceforth be more closely bound to that of Central Europe, while remaining subordinate to the *entente* with Moscow.

The western frontiers were approved by the plebiscite of June 30, which covered not only the frontier-ratification, but also the abolition of the Senate and the economic organisation of the State (Agrarian reform and nationalisation of key industries). The first ballot gave 10,534,697 in favour and 995,584 against; the second gave 7,844,522 in favour and 3,686,029 against; the third, 8,896,106 in favour and 2,634,446 against.

This popular referendum did not have the tranquillising effects that had seemingly been expected. Poland continued to be a prey to 'terrorist' agitation, the repression of which, in turn, gave rise to scenes of violence and to exactions. While dissociating himself from the extremists, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, M. Mikolajczyk, himself protested against the way in which the referendum had been carried out (except in Cracow, where the 'Noes' had been in the majority). So the British Government reserved its opinion on the legitimacy which this poll conferred on the régime, and awaited the general elections before giving legal recognition to the new state of affairs. And the whole of 1946 was taken up with exchanges of subacid notes between London and Washington on the one side and Warsaw on the other. The Anglo-Americans denounced the persecution to which the Opposition was subjected, and considered that the Polish Government was failing in the undertaking given in execution of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to guarantee the liberty of elections. But the Russians interpreted quite differently both the scope of these agreements and the meaning of the word 'liberty'. And so the most obvious result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of England and the United States was to intensify Polish-Sovietic solidarity.

The formation, in June, of a National Unity Government under the Presidency of M. Osubka Morawski seemed, for the time being, to dissipate the apprehensions of the Anglo-Americans, although the dissident Polish Government in London

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The problem of the relations between Prague and Bratislava was difficult to settle. It had handicapped the political development of the country from 1919 to 1938, and six years of separate life (from 1938 to 1944) had not failed to add fresh grievances to the old ones. In addition to all this, Slovakia herself suffered from an internal crisis—antagonism between a heterogeneous Catholic majority and a united, combative, Communist minority. The Democratic Party, which comprised the Catholics, presented a front only in the struggle against Marxism, the Soviet stranglehold, and Czech Centralism. In the face of constructive problems it was divided. It suffered, moreover, under the suspicion of having owed its electoral triumph only to the Autonomists and to the former 'collaborators'. Here, as elsewhere, the Communist Party sought to monopolise all the merit of the Resistance.

And Slovak particularism had not disarmed. This was made clear when, in the summer of 1946, the central Government ordered exchanges between Czech and Slovak military units; this order met with violent resistance.

However, that is a problem which the Czechs have had time to study, and in which they have acquired bitter, but profound, experience. It is a psychological rather than a political problem, affected by social and religious reactions, not to mention the campaign against the régime carried on by Slovak exiles in America, under the leadership of M. Stephan Osusky, former Czechoslovak Minister in Paris. It is possible that the fundamental difference between the two peoples may lie in the fact that one was under the heel of the German, the other of the Magyar.

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On June 24 was concluded an agreement destined to become the foundation of the new Czechoslovak community, based on a formula which lies half-way between decentralisation and autonomy. This is how it works. Apart from the three reserved departments (Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and Foreign Trade), Slovakia has her own organs of representation and government: a National Council of one hundred members, drawn from the parties, empowered to settle purely Slovak questions; an Executive Council composed of fifteen Commissars appointed by the Czech Government on the nomination of the Slovak National Council. These Commissars are, at one and the same time, real Ministers as far as Slovak affairs are

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666 175 98.89 per cent (110,180 blank votes), the electors having no other option than to vote for the 'Front' or to register a blank vote.

185 175 Faithful to the guidance of Benes, Jean Masaryk and Ripka, the Third National Front Government, presided over by Gottwald, endeavoured to secure the triumph of a policy of equilibrium between East and West, between Liberalism and Marxism. 'In our country', declared Benes, 'under the pressure of the masses, Communism has become national.'

648 175 The first signs of Soviet pressure were seen when, after the Czech Cabinet had decided, in July, 1947, to accept an invitation to attend the Paris Conference for the application of the Marshall Plan, it was forced, on orders from Moscow, to withdraw its acceptance.

• [578] The final crisis was reached in February, 1948. An exceedingly violent press campaign was launched against Vaclav Nosek, Minister of the Interior, as the result of a purge which followed the discovery of illegal arms deposits. The Communist Party accused the National Socialists (Benes Party), the Popular Democrats and the Slovak Democrats of attempting to constitute an 'anti-Communist bloc' within the Government, and of paralysing the legislative power of the National Assembly. Tension reached its peak with the approach of the elections, then fixed for April 11, 1948.

668 642 175 The partisans of obedience to Moscow centred their efforts around the nucleus of the police and the trade union organisations. A 'Central Action Committee' was established, to back up, by mass movements, the offensive led by President Gottwald and his Communist colleagues against the moderate section of the Government. On February 20, 1948, the Ministers belonging to the three incriminated parties resigned. The Marxists held demonstrations in the streets; a political strike was declared on February 4, and the Congress of Works' Committees demanded the removal of the 'reactionaries'. President Benes, taken unawares by the suddenness of this attack, rejected the idea of a Government of Civil Servants and, on February 25, he formed a new National Front Ministry, with Gottwald as President, Gapotocki as Vice-President, Jean Masaryk at the head of Foreign Affairs. The Communists secured entire control of this Cabinet, which was in favour of unconditional collaboration with the Soviet Union. The opposition was reduced to

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origin), as Minister of Defence in the Warsaw Cabinet; he took as his deputy General Wladislaw Korczye, Chief of Staff of the Polish Army. This appointment was naturally interpreted as a further step in the subordination of Poland to the Soviet interests.

And the Polish-Sovietic *rapprochement* (at governmental level) had an unexpected result: the expulsion or the trial, on the ritual charge of spying, of French diplomats and nationals (Wroclaw case), thus creating a state of tension between two countries whose friendship had historic and spiritual roots of such strength that no political vicissitudes had hitherto been able to affect them.

* * *

Thus the events of 1948–1949 once more disturbed that 'Slav solidarity' which had been revived by the Second World War. It cannot be said that there exist, between the Soviet Union on the one side, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, on the other, ties which are stronger than, or of any different nature from, those which unite Moscow to Budapest or to Bucharest. The 'collaboration' operates exclusively on the basis of Stalin-Marxism and obedience to Moscow.

On the contrary, the Soviet Union's Enemy Number One is Tito's Yugoslavia. There is violent and complete rupture between the Southern Slavs for the one part, the Bulgarians, Eastern and Northern Slavs for the other.

The historic current which has, periodically, split up the world of the Slavs, has reasserted its mysterious disintegrating force.

Two small but typical facts may serve as a postscript to this study. On Stalin's seventieth birthday the only country which sent no 'homage' to the master of the Kremlin was Yugoslavia. And the President of the Panslav Congress in the United States, George Pirinsky, was imprisoned in Chicago as belonging to an organisation aiming at the overthrow of the American Government by force.